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Anomaly Detection and Mitigation for Wide-Area
Damping Control using Machine Learning
Gelli Ravikumar, Member, IEEE, and Manimaran Govindarasu, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In an interconnected multi-area power system, wide-
area measurement based damping controllers are used to damp
out inter-area oscillations, which jeopardize grid stability and
constrain the power flows below to their transmission capacity.
The effect of wide-area damping control (WADC) significantly
depends on both power and cyber systems. At the cyber
system layer, an adversary can inflict the WADC process by
compromising either measurement signals, control signals or
both. Stealthy and coordinated cyber-attacks may bypass the
conventional cybersecurity measures to disrupt the seamless
operation of WADC. This paper proposes an anomaly detection
(AD) algorithm using supervised Machine Learning and a model-
based logic for mitigation. The proposed AD algorithm considers
measurement signals (input of WADC) and control signals
(output of WADC) as input to evaluate the type of activity such
as normal, perturbation (small or large signal faults), attack and
perturbation-and-attack. Upon anomaly detection, the mitigation
module tunes the WADC signal and sets the control status
mode as either wide-area mode or local mode. The proposed
anomaly detection and mitigation (ADM) module works inline
with the WADC at the control center for attack detection on both
measurement and control signals and eliminates the need for
ADMs at the geographically distributed actuators. We consider
coordinated and primitive data-integrity attack vectors such as
pulse, ramp, relay-trip and replay attacks. The performance of
the proposed ADM algorithms was evaluated under these attack
vector scenarios on a testbed environment for 2-area 4-machine
power system. The ADM module shows effective performance
with 96.5% accuracy to detect anomalies.
Index Terms—Anomaly detection, oscillations, PMU, Machine
Learning, wide-area damping control and measurement system.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE electromechanical low-frequency oscillation (LFO)modes [1], a manifestation of relative movement of rotor
angle position of generators [2], in an interconnected multi-
area power system affect the system stability margins and
impose constraints on the inter-tie power transfer capability.
Typically, there are two significant sets of LFO modes (fre-
quency components) present in the multi-area power systems,
which are inter-area oscillation (IAO) modes (0.1−1 Hz) and
local modes (1 − 2 Hz). In addition to the traditional damp-
ing torque analysis and modal analysis, various model-based
deterministic and measurements-based probabilistic methods
have been developed for oscillation modal analysis and robust
controller designs for damping LFO modes [2]–[7]. It is
evident from these techniques that local measurement sys-
tem based actuators provide effective damping to the local
oscillation modes as they constrained (limited) to local modal
observability [8] whereas the wide-area measurement system
Gelli Ravikumar and Manimaran Govindarasu are with the Department of
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(WAMS) based actuators provide effective damping to the IAO
modes as they have global modal observability.
The wide-area damping control (WADC) is one of the
critical wide-area control system (WACS) applications in mod-
ern power systems. A wide-area damping controller, typically
located at the control center, synthesizes a set of remote
measurement signals to generate WADC signals to dispatch
to the geographically distributed actuators. The performance
of WACS applications significantly depends on the dynamics
of both power and cyber systems.
The significant challenges to design WADC application
include selection of wide-area measurements and actuators
that receive wide-area control signals to modulate the power
system components such as generators, high voltage DC
transmission (HVDC) devices [9]–[12] and flexible AC trans-
mission system (FACTS) devices [12]. The dynamics due to
the cyber systems on the WADC application include quality of
services (QoS) such as low latency, less packet-drop and high
reliability. In addition to these system dynamics, the stochastic
nature of cyber-attacks on both power and cyber systems may
severely impact the performance of WACS applications such
as WADC, which may endanger power system operations
and affect grid stability. Stealthy and coordinated cyber-attack
vectors may bypass the conventional cybersecurity measures
to disrupt the seamless operation of WACS applications. Ad-
versaries deploy these cyber-attack vectors to modify the com-
promised data channels (either measurement signals, control
signals or both), which manifests the cyber-attack anomalies
to the actual data, of the WACS applications. Therefore, it is
essential to build an attack-resilient system, which can detect,
mitigate and prevent the cyber-attack anomalies, for the WACS
applications.
Recently, HVDC-based WADC system is designed and
demonstrated [9]–[11] for the Pacific DC Intertie (PDCI) in the
North American Western Interconnection (WI). The controller
prototype synthesizes real-time synchrophasor feedback sig-
nals to generate a control signal that modulates the parallel
Pacific HVDC Intertie to damp Pacific AC Intertie (PACI)
oscillations. The China Southern and Central Grids (CSG and
CCG) have established a centralized adaptive WADC system
that modulates multiple HVDC systems to damp out dominant
IAO modes exhibiting in the range of 0.3 Hz and 0.8 Hz [13]–
[15]. On the other hand, the cyber-attacks on the Ukrainian
power grid [16] witness that adversaries can take control of
SCADA systems to inflict the system operation. It shut down
the power supply for more than 200,000 consumers. Therefore,
it is crucial to consider the attack resiliency for the secure
operation of the wide-area control system, which is sensitive
to the cyber-attacks, particularly the data-integrity attacks.
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Over the recent decade, there has been an extensive research
on off-line-based AD [17], [18] and ML-based online AD
using the synchrophasor measurements to detect anomalies
on the frequency, voltage, power oscillations [19]–[22]. All
of these detection methods monitor synchrophasors on the
measurement-signal segment, which limits the scope to the
wide-area monitoring and measurement system based ap-
plications. The cyber-physical control system of the power
grid includes attack surface on both measurement-signal and
control-signal segments. Therefore, it is required to build
an attack-resiliency for WACS applications such as WADC
against both the attack surface segments. On the other hand,
various resilient wide-area control designs have been devel-
oped against cyber system events such as communication
failures and delay tolerance [23]–[28]. These methods are
limited to modeling cyber system events under the control
system perspective to achieve resiliency for WADC system
operation. Therefore, there is a substantial need to develop
models and algorithms for attack-resilient WACS operation
against stealthy cyberattacks on both measurement-signal and
control-signal segments.
In this paper, we propose, an attack-resilient wide-
area damping control system using Machine Learning-based
anomaly detection and model-based mitigation (ADM) algo-
rithms executed in a control center environment.
Contribution: The key contributions of our research are:
• Propose an anomaly detection (AD) algorithm using su-
pervised Machine Learning and Model-based mitigation.
• Propose physics-based and signal-entropy based feature
extraction to increase the detection accuracy and robust-
ness of the trained ML model.
• Propose a combined power system operating conditions
and cyberattack events-based dataset generation model
using parallel execution approach so that to use for any
large-scale power grid models.
• Testbed-based demonstration using hardware-in-the-loop
(HIL) WADC integrated with ADM for a cyber-physical
closed-loop test power system.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II elucidates
the proposed approach for the attack-resilient WADC system.
Sections III proposes the anomaly detection using Machine
Learning (ML) and a suitable mitigation technique. Section IV
demonstrates and evaluates the proposed ADM for the WADC
application.
II. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE AR-WADC SYSTEM
A schematic diagram of the proposed ADM methodology
for the attack-resilient WADC (AR-WADC) system is shown
in Fig. 1. The geographically distributed PMUs compute the
synchrophasor measurements from the current transformers
(CTs) and potential transformers (PTs) and transfer them to the
configured local and super phasor data concentrators (PDCs).
The local PDCs are typically deployed at the substations
when they comprise of multiple PMUs whereas the super
PDCs operated at the control centers for the collection of
synchrophasors from the system-wide PMUs and PDCs. The
suitability of existing synchrophasor networks [29] can be
Fig. 1. Schematic Diagram for Proposed Attack-Resilient WADC System
configured based on the time-critical wide-area applications
and the quality of services (QoS) such as low latency, high
bandwidth, and less packet-drop. We use the IEEE-C37.118
protocol for the synchrophasor data communication, and the
DNP3 and IEC-61850 protocols for the SCADA data and con-
trol signal communication across the control center, actuators,
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) and remote terminal units
(RTUs).
It is inevitable that the adequate damping of IAO by the
WADC system significantly depends on the selection of wide-
area input measurements, actuators, and the latency. Various
approaches have been devised to build robust and delay-
tolerant WADC system for ensuring better performance during
the high-latency scenarios. However, besides to the typical
cyber-attacks like malware-based and denial-of-service (DoS)-
based, adversaries can deploy stealthy and coordinated data-
integrity cyber-attack vectors such as Pulse-attacks, Ramp-
attacks and Switching-attacks on the measurement signals,
control signals or both. These can severely affect the operation
of the WADC system. Further, it may also lead to system
instability with the effect of negative damping. This paper
proposes an AR-WADC system operation by the integration of
the Machine Learning and model-based ADM to the WADC
processor as shown in Fig. 1. The S1 or S2 switch operates
WADC system without or with ADM respectively.
The Fig. 2 shows the two phases of the proposed AR-WADC
operation. The first phase includes the training of ML model
that detects cyber-attack anomalies, and the second phase
comprises of its integration with the WADC and mitigation
techniques in the closed-loop system operation. The proposed
ADM module processes both the WADC signal and the wide-
area measurements received from the super PDC. In the
closed-loop AR-WADC system operation, the anomalies of
the compromised measurement signals appear on the current
cycle whereas the next cycle for the compromised control
signals. The ADM module includes trained ML model to
detect the activity type such as normal, perturbation (voltage
perturbations at generators or faults), attack and attack-and-
perturbation. If it detects cyber anomalies, then the mitigation
sub-module modifies the WADC signal and sets the WADC
status mode to 0. The control signal dispatcher (CSD) sends
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Fig. 2. Proposed Methodology for Training ML model for Anomaly
Detection and Closed-loop AR-WADC System Operation with ADM
both the control and status data to the wide-area actuator,
which operates if the status mode set to 1. We consider
designing the status signal besides the control data to set the
operation of the actuator from the wide-area mode to local-
mode or off. It plays an essential role to prevent the penetration
of anomalies due to the compromised control signals to the
wide-area actuators.
III. PROPOSED ANOMALY DETECTION USING ML
Machine Learning (ML) has evolved from the study of
pattern recognition [30] and has explored for the construction
of algorithms that utilizes data to learn and build models.
These trained ML models overcome the static program in-
structions by making data-driven predictions, decisions, and
classifications. We use ML algorithms to build trained models
where it is infeasible or difficult to design algorithms explicitly
for the data-driven applications. For instance, the detection of
network intruders, stochastic nature of cyber-attack anomalies,
recognition of patterns and computer vision. The essential
modules to build trained models include dataset preparation,
extraction of features from the dataset and the ML algorithms.
Fig. 3 shows the systematic process of these three modules for
building a trained ML model. Feature selection is essential in
the ML algorithm to improve detection accuracy and eliminate
inappropriate attributes. The following subsections discuss
proposed robust set of feature vectors and a systematic method
for the generation of the dataset including power system and
cyber-attack events. Further, it discusses trained ML models
using supervised ML algorithms [31] and demonstrate their
accuracy for a power system using hardware-in-the-loop syn-
chrophasor cyber-physical system (CPS) security testbed.
A. Preparation of Dataset Models
The dataset includes synchrophasor measurement data for
various power system operating conditions (αpsoc) including
perturbations and cyber system attack events (βcsae). A generic
Fig. 3. Proposed Anomaly Detection System using Machine Learning
configuration of the cyber-physical system (CPS) of WACS
includes actuators, PMUs, cyber network devices and WACS
application modules located at the control center as articulated
in Fig. 1. We consider the CPS of WACS applications to
prepare the dataset for training and testing the proposed ADM
using ML. The performance of the ML relies significantly on
the abundant dataset whereas it is important to observe the
absence of a practical dataset comprising αpsoc and βcsae.
Therefore, it is inevitable to devise a systematic methodology
to generate the CPS dataset through a set of simulations.
The dataset comprising of αpsoc and βcsae for a considered
network is defined as follows:
Dataset = D = f(αpsoc, βcsae) (1)
αpsoc = {αvp, αf , αld, αgd, αlc} (2)
βcsae = {βp, βr, βrt, βfd, βct} (3)
We consider a set of αpsoc including possible perturbation
scenarios, which include voltage perturbations (αvp) at gener-
ators, faults (αf ), load (αld) and generation (αgd) deviations,
and line contingencies (αlc). Each scenario may turn the
selected power system to a stable, marginally stable or an
unstable operating condition. In addition to these αpsoc, we
consider a set of possible stealthy cyber-attack vectors that
may impact the power system stability. The set of βcsae
include pulse attack (βp), ramp attack (βr), relay-trip attack
(βrt), replay attack (βrp), false-data injection attack (βfd),
and coordinated attacks with simultaneous or sequential timing
vector (βct) on the measurement and control signals. As these
cyber-attack vectors are stochastic in nature, we consider their
presence on both ideal and αpsoc scenarios. The βcsae can be
defined as follows:
βcsae =

βp = f(λm, λp, λw, λt) ∀t ∈ ta
βr = f(λm, λs, λt) ∀t ∈ ta
βrp = f(λr, λtc, λt) ∀t ∈ ta
βfd = f(λfr, λpe, λmd, λt) ∀t ∈ ta
βct = f(λav, λat, λt) ∀t ∈ ta
(4)
where, λt defines duration of attack-time, ta represents dura-
tion of attack period, and the other variables explained below
in the corresponding subsections. We refer any of the following
attack as stealthy whenever it poses difficult problem to the
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conventional bad-data detectors and increase its false positive
rate.
Pulse Attack (βp): Pulse attack is prepared with essentially
three parameters, namely, attack magnitude (λm), duration
of pulse period (λp), width of pulse ON duration (λw). A
pulse attack applied on a true data signal can be inclusive
(additive) or exclusive (subtraction). As the nature of pulse
attacks, it injects an amplitude of frequency components to
the true data signals. A stealthy pulse attack is constructed by
a right choice of amplitude component (λm) and frequency
component, which is defined by the λp and λw.
Ramp Attack (βr): Ramp attack prepared with essentially
two parameters, namely, attack magnitude (λm) and slope of
the ramp signal (λs). A ramp attack applied on a true data
signal can be inclusive (additive) or exclusive (subtraction). As
the nature of ramp attack, it injects a continuous increase or
decrease of amplitude to the true data signals. A stealthy ramp
attack is constructed by a right choice of amplitude and slope.
A ramp attack with small slope changes the true data signal
at a slower rate, which means it can bypass the conventional
bad-data detector.
Relay-trip Attack (βrt): These are man-in-the-middle type
of attacks. It essentially includes two tasks, namely, identi-
fication of vulnerable relay (λr), also known as intelligent
electronic device (IED), and launching a trip or close (λtc)
operation by SCADA protocols (DNP3, IEC-61850, Modbus).
False-data Injection Attack (βfd): Adversaries use the sys-
tem properties to manipulate the data. For instance, injection
of signals from fault recordings (λfr, fault-reading based data
injection), extracting a block of data from the past and repeat
that in the transient condition (λpe, past-event-based replay
attack), Missing data attack (λmd).
Coordinated Attack (βct): These attacks are more stealthy
as adversaries use any combination of attacks to launch an
attack-vector (λav) comprising of different cyber-attack events
and various attack-time sequence (λat) events.
A compromised signal (x∗(t)) with a data-integrity attack
(βcsae) can be defined as
x∗(t) = (1 + βcsae)× x(t) ∀t ∈ ta (5)
where, the x(t) can be either measurement or control signal
of an operation condition defined in αpsoc and ta represents
duration of attack period.
As shown in Fig. 3, we prepare a power system model
in a simulation environment, and a set of comma separated
value (CSV) files, wherein each file represent a simulation
instance variables comprising of system variables of the model
and scenario variables from the αpsoc and βcsae operating
conditions and attack events.
1) Dataset Generator (Parallel Execution): We consider
isolating the simulation instance variables from the simula-
tion model to facilitate optimal parallel execution of all the
plausible simulation instances. This process is essential to
prepare a rich dataset for a large-scale power system including
the substantial size of actuators and measurements, where
the number of possible attacks and possible combinations
on various system operating conditions leads to a massive
set of simulation scenarios. It is critical to use either high-
performance computing (HPC) or parallel computing environ-
ment to execute all the simulation scenarios in parallel. In this
module, we utilize parallel computing toolbox to dynamically
auto-assign the simulation instances to the workers of the
cluster in the Matlab environment. As of 2018, the maximum
number of workers in a parallel computer cluster are 1024 [32]
under Matlab cloud center environment, which means it can
execute 1024 simulation instances in parallel. On the other
hand, with a trade-off between accuracy and extensive com-
putation, the total number of simulation scenarios can be
reduced by a weighted-random selection on the number of
combination of channels that may be exposed to attack. In
ideal case, we consider all the combinations i.e., αpsoc × βcsae
× 2n. However, wa × 2n combinations can be considered
with a statistical threat analysis such that the wa can vary
between 0 and 1. The wa represents a weight associated to
select a number of combinations from whole set of 2n. The
number of power system operating conditions and cyber attack
events defines the scope of detecting anomalies by the trained
ML model with the 95% confidence interval rate of detection
accuracy.
2) Dataset Preprocessor for Training and Testing: It in-
cludes two primary tasks. i) Assign labels: Supervised ML al-
gorithms require labeled dataset as an input. In this module, we
assign tags to the generated data of each simulation instance
by their corresponding scenarios such as normal, perturba-
tion (small or large signal disturbances like faults, generator
outages, and line contingencies), attack and perturbation-and-
attack. ii) Prepare window frames: We consider a suitable size
of a window length on the labeled-dataset to prepare a vector
of data points (window frame) to preserve the characteristics
for a period of the window length. We consider a moving
window method with a one-point deviation, which means
every new window frame excludes oldest data point and
includes the latest data point. This step is essential to execute
trained-ML module in real-time, PMU data rate of 60 fps
(frames per second), under closed-loop HIL simulation. These
window frames of the labeled-dataset will be used to build a
rich dataset of features to train ML algorithms.
B. Proposed Features for the Anomaly Detection
Raw input data such as measurements from PMUs can be
directly used as features to train an ML model. However, it
affects detection accuracy and performance of such trained
ML models, mainly when there are multiple power system
events in conjunction with attack-activity events. Therefore,
physics-based and signal-entropy based feature extraction, a
process of computing inherited patterns from the window
frames of the labeled-dataset, is crucial to building a robust
trained ML model for anomaly detection. These domain-
specific features obeying physical laws of a complex power
system reinforces the cohesiveness among the event patterns in
the data streams. In addition to the features derived from statis-
tical [33] techniques, these proposed domain-specific features
improve detection accuracy for various subtly varying events,
which may occur when adversaries deploy stealthy cyber-
attack vectors that are in proximity to the natural power system
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events such as small-signal and large-signal perturbations. A
single or a combination of these features specify an activity
detection. The training process of a supervised ML model
builds an associative weight map between these features and
a labeled data. The trained ML model accuracy depends on
the weight map accuracy, which relies on the voluminous of
training dataset and robust extracted features. Algorithm 1
shows the extraction of following proposed features.
Algorithm 1 Feature Extraction
while (all features are not processed) do
- Define feature vectors: fv  {ftkeo, fpca, fwasm, fprimitive}
- Feature Extraction:
while (all i of fv are not processed) do
- Define a new feature variable i  fv
- Compute the i
end while
- Feature Selection: Exclude the redundancy/inappropriate fea-
ture variables in the fv
end while
- Output the filtered feature variables, which feed through the
trained ML model for anomaly detection.
1) Teager-Kaiser Energy Operator (TKEO): It is defined to
estimate an instantaneous signal energy (ΨTK [∗]) [34] for the
discrete (x(n)) time signal and an example trajectory signal
as
ΨTK [x(n)] = x
2
n − xn−1xn+1 (6)
ΨTK [e
−αnAcos(ωn)] = e−2αnA2ω2 (7)
During the transient variations, the first component of the
ΨTK [∗] becomes dominant and contributes to the impulsive
responsive on the signal energy. The ΨTK [∗] produces neg-
ligible variations on the signal energy for the natural power
system oscillations and the oscillatory modes such as IAO and
LO. The TKEO acts as a better indicator to track the trajectory
of the damped IAO and LO modes, where the trajectory of an
exemplified signal can be obtained as in (7). As it provides
a better estimate on the transient variations, the extraction
of this feature on the raw input data signals can act as a
better indicator to distinguish the transient variations between
natural power system events and the stealthy cyber-attack
vectors deployed by adversaries. It is also applied on the PMU
data to predict the frequency and detection of power system
oscillations [35]. As it provides a better estimate on the signal
energy, it has been used widely in various signal processing
techniques, and one of the significant application is tracking
the envelope of Amplitude Modulation (AM) signals [36].
Further, we consider a correlative feature by deriving the inter-
action energy (ΨCTK(xn, yn)) between the two signals. This
correlative feature strengths the accuracy of attack-activity
detection. The interaction or cross-energy (ΨCTK(xn, yn))
and its normalization over a time-window (say 0 to N ) by
the Energy-based Similarity Measure (EbSM) [36]–[38] for
continuous and discrete time signals can be defined as follows:
ΨCTK(xn, yn) = xn−1yn−1 − xnyn−2 + ynxn−2
2
(8)
EbSM(xn, yn) =
√
2
∑N
n=0 ΨCTK(xn, yn)∑N
n=0
√
Ψ2CTK(xn, xn) + Ψ
2
CTK(yn, yn)
(9)
2) Principal Component Analysis (PCA): To obtain dimen-
sionality reduction (without loss of significant information)
and patterns identification over the high-dimensional data, we
use PCA [39] in the process of feature extraction. It uses or-
thogonal transformation to convert a window (either temporal,
spatial or both) of observations or measurements of possibly
correlated variables into a set of linearly independent variables
called principal components (PCs). A set of x variables with
n measurements (higher-dimension) can have min(n − 1, x)
distinct orthogonal PCs (lower-dimension), where each PC
represents the data variability (variance) in the direction of its
corresponding unit eigenvector. It is vital in the ML algorithm
to use the PCs with relatively high variance that capture at
least 95% variance of the input data set. It is essential to
consider the dominant PCs as features to avoid over-fitting and
to improve the accuracy and computation time of the activity
detection. The PCA and its variants with computationally
efficient algorithms for computing the PCs have been used
widely in various ML applications [40]–[42].
3) Wide-Area System Measures (WASMs): We use WASMs
based features in the ML algorithm to identify the anomalies
by the stealthy cyber-attack vectors that are distinct from
the natural power system events. The WASMs comprising
of coherency and non-coherency based indices characterize
the dynamics of power system events. We recently published
the efficacy of the significant WASMs for angle-stability
assessment [7]. These indices identify the event patterns over
the PMU data streams and provide measures for the system
stability and dynamic security assessments in real-time or near
real-time. As these indices form a closed set of threshold
values based on the system dynamics of the power system,
we consider the indices to extract the features in the ML
algorithm for improving the accuracy to the identification
of power system events and the cyber-attack events. The
mathematical models and detailed procedures of the WASMs
are discussed in [7] to calculate the coherency and non-
coherency based measures such as coherency sensitivity in-
dicators, integral square generator angle (ISGA), wide-area
severity index (WASI) and integral square bus angle (ISBA).
For Ng generators in an ith area of a multi-area power system,
the COI of the area, system COI, the relative rotor angle
deviation of a generator referred to the ith area, and the ith
area referred to its system can be defined as:
δCOIi =
1
Mi
Ngi∑
k=1
Mkδk (10)
δCOIsystem =
1∑Narea
i=1 Mi
Narea∑
i=1
MiδCOIi (11)
δCOIik = δk − δCOIi (12)
δ
COIsystem
i = δi − δCOIsystem (13)
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Where, Mk and δk are inertia and rotor angle of the kth
generator. Ngi and Mi are the number of generators and
cumulative inertia of the ith area respectively.
4) Primitive Measures: The rate of change, mean, standard
deviation and root mean squared (RMS) functions over a
window of raw synchrophasor input data provide a primary
relationship between the signals. We consider these primitives
as features to preserve the primary variations on the input
signals and provide better measures in stable system operation.
C. Supervised ML Algorithms for Trained Models
Extensive research on ML algorithms for the data-intensive
complex domain applications have led to the development
of TensorFlow [43], an open-source ML platform, to train
ML models. On the other hand, Matlab has provided ML
toolbox [44] for plug-and-play of various supervised and un-
supervised ML algorithms. We use supervised ML algorithms,
namely, support vector machine (SVM), decision trees, k-
nearest neighbor, Naive Bayes, discriminant analysis, logistic
regression, and neural networks for the classification of data.
The SVM and KNN exhibit greater performance for the
classification of anomalies; on the other hand, the KNN and
DT converge more quickly and shortens the training time [45].
Hence, we consider DT and KNN ML algorithms for anomaly
detection. In particular, we consider three variants (Fine Tree,
Medium Tree and Coarse Tree) of the Decision Tree (DT),
and six variants (Fine KNN, Medium KNN, Coarse KNN, Co-
sine, Cubic KNN and Weighted KNN) of K-Nearest Neighbor
(KNN) supervised ML models for the detection of cyber-
attack anomalies. We consider ML toolbox [44] available in
the Matlab environment to build a trained model, which is
then integrated with the WADC module to work in real-time
on HIL CPS testbed.
D. Mitigation Technique
We have two segments of attack surfaces, namely, attacks
on the measurement signals and attacks on the control signals.
We consider deploying the ADM module at the control center
to detect anomalies on both measurement and control data.
The ADM detects the attack anomalies and the corresponding
channel indices of the compromised signals. Accordingly, the
ADM performs suitable mitigation techniques for AR-WADC
operation as follows: i) If there is an attack on a measurement
signal, then it passes through the ADM on the current cycle.
Subsequently, the ADM detects and sends a tuned WADC
signal to wide-area actuators. ii) If there is an attack on a
control signal, then it passes through the ADM only in the
next control cycle loop. Subsequently, the ADM detects the
anomalies and compromised channels. However, in this case,
a tuned WADC signal would not be sufficient as the attacks
are happening on the control signal side that affects the tuned
control signal again. Two possible mitigation methods, Only-
PSS mode and Reconfiguration mode, are as follows:
Only-PSS mode: It considers operating the system using
local signals to sustain the stable operation until the exclusion
of attacks. As the ADM module detects the attacks on the
control signal side, it issues the WADC status mode zero (0)
Fig. 4. Schematic Diagram of the AR-WADC for Two-Area Power System
Fig. 5. Integration of ADM and WADC for Attack-Resilient WACS Operation
to the actuators so that they operate with local signals. The
process to switch between the wide-area control signals and
local signals explained in [25].
Reconfiguration mode: It is useful when a system has
WADC with redundant input and output signals. In this case,
reconfiguration of WADC can be carried out with reliable
data channels to avoid only-PSS mode of operation. The
hybrid WADC design [26]–[28] by reconfiguration of input
and output communication channels enhances the resiliency
of the WADC closed-loop operation.
IV. TESTBED-BASED IMPLEMENTATION
We consider the four-machine two-area power system net-
work shown in Fig. 4 for the demonstration of AR-WADC
application. The ADM module monitors all the PMU mea-
surements to detect anomalies, and WADC module uses the
required PMU data and synthesizes a control signal. Fig. 5
shows a detailed view of the ADM and WADC Modules and
their integration in the closed-loop operation. The selected
power system is implemented on the OP5600 OPAL-RT real-
time digital simulator integrated with the hardware setup avail-
able at the PowerCyber [46] lab in the Iowa State University.
We integrate the model with the virtual PMUs provided by
the ARTEMiS-SSN of the OPAL-RT. We use the SEL-3373
hardware PDC to collect and transfer the synchrophasors from
the PMUs to the WADC module. The WADC module uses
the selected wide-area measurements from the super PDC
to synthesize a control signal to dispatch to geographically
distributed actuators. The subsequent sections discuss the
implementation and evaluation of the WADC operation and
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Fig. 6. WADC Design and Tuning the Controller Parameters
its integration with the proposed ADM algorithm for the
demonstration AR-WADC system operation.
A. Design of WADC
The Fig. 6 shows the process followed for the design of
the WADC processor. We use the Matlab for calculating the
full-order nonlinear model of the considered power system. We
consider the detailed models for all the synchronous generators
that includes the governor, two-axis model with exciter, and
PSS with lead-lag phase compensation blocks. We linearize
the systems of equations of the nonlinear model around a
selected operating point, which is a well proven systematic
approach to build a general solution to the complex non-linear
power systems and is instrumental in the applications such
as small signal analysis, stability and security margins, and
controller designs. We convert the linear model into state-
space representation. It provides the system dynamics as a set
of input, output and state variables (a minimum set of internal
variables whose values evolve through time in response to their
system dynamics) that form coupled first-order differential
equations. We carry out the small-signal analysis on the state-
space model for estimating the parameters characterizing the
IAO modes such as damping ratio, frequency, phase, and
amplitude.
We consider the eigenvalue modal analysis and the residue
methods for the study of observability and controllability of
IAO modes. We consider the right half-plane zeros (RHP-
zeros) method for the identification of zeros on the right-half
plane that specifies the instability margins. The observability
analysis is used to identify the wide-area feedback signals
that inherit the dominant IAO modes. We select the candidate
feedback signals from the PMU dataset that includes positive-
sequence voltage and current signals, phase angle, frequency
and the derived signals such as active and reactive power on
the lines, rotor speed and its deviation, and generator state
variables. The observability analysis shows that IAO modes
Fig. 7. Time-Delay Sequence of WADC System Operation
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Fig. 8. PSS Performance during Voltage Perturbation
are observable on the PMUs connected to the tie-line and the
PMUs connected to the generators 2 and 3. We select the
phasor measurements of PMU-2, PMU-3, PMU-4 and PMU-
5 from the super PDC and estimate the deviation of rotor
speed of generators to use as wide-area feedback signals to
the WADC processor.
The controllability analysis is used to identify the wide-area
actuators that process WADC signals to damp the IAO modes.
The actuators can integrate with the three types of devices such
as PSS, HVDC, and FACTS, which controls the active and
reactive power to increase the damping ratio of the power sys-
tem. We consider two wadc-actuators (wide-area power system
stabilizer - WA-PSS), one at the generator-3 and the other at
the generator-2 as shown in Fig. 4. These WA-PSS process
the control signals received from the WADC. In addition to
the local-signal based PSS, the WA-PSS further supplements
the excitation control to the generator to contribute to damp
the IAO modes and increase the system stability. The high
amplify gain of the PSS can provide a relatively better control
efficiency with low amplified signals. As the power system
includes more PSS devices compared to the FACTS and
HVDC, the flexibility to select and integrate the wide-area
actuators with PSS is relatively high. However, the actuator
integrated with HVDC system can provide faster and direct
control to the active power transmitted over the inter-tie lines
to damp IAO modes. The field tests on the HVDC based
WADC in the China Southern Power Grid (CSG) [13]–[15]
have shown an increase of the damping ratio from 7.551% to
20.459% on an IAO mode. Though the primary application
of the FACTS devices is to modulate active power flow
to enhance power transfer capacity, it is witnessed that the
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FACTS-based WADC can also exhibit effective performance
even under the effect of network latency [47].
1) State-space Modeling and Parameter Selection for
WADC: Over three decades, there has been an extensive
research delved into the state-space modeling and optimal
design of gain and parameters for the WADC [48], [49]. Var-
ious simulation and hardware designs of wide-area damping
controllers can be found at [12]. In this section, we brief out
the state-space modeling and considered WADC design for
the implementation. To identify LO and IAO modes of Ng
generator system, the state space model [48] is defined as –
x˙ = Ax+Bu = Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj
yj = Cjx
(14)
where x′ = [∆δ′ ∆ω′]; Bj is input matrix (column vector)
and Cj is output matrix (row vector) for jth generator. The A
includes 2∗Ng eigenvalues, wherein Ng−1 complex conjugate
pairs represent LO and IAO modes. The derivation and design
of these parameters can be found at [12].
The synthesis of the selected wide-area feedback signals is
defined by the robust mixed H2/H∞ output-feedback control
with regional pole placement constraints. It is evaluated using
the linear matrix inequality (LMI) method employed by the
h2hinfsyn [50] function of the Matlab for the calculation of
parameters of the WADC processor. The WADC implementa-
tion design and the time constants are defined as follows. The
state space model of WADC is defined as –
X˙k = AkXk +BkUk
Yk = CkXk +DkUk
(15)
Where Uk = [∆ω′]. The theorems for deriving these design
parameters including delay tolerance using the LMI methods
can be found at [49]. The result of LMI method consists of
optimal gain and Hi(s) of the WADC. A detailed derivation
for gain matrix for PSS using LMI is provided in [51] and
scheduling of WADC KWADC in relation with PDCs is
provided in [52]. The selected WADC for the implementation
is defined as –
HWADC(s) = KWADC
sTw
1 + sTw
(
1 + sTlead
1 + sTlag
)n
(16)
= KWADCHi(s) (17)
φc = pi − argRj (18)
θ =
Tlead
Tlag
=
1− sin(φc/n))
1 + sin(φc/n))
(19)
Tlag =
1
ωn
√
θ
, Tlead = θTlag (20)
where KWADC - WADC gain; Tw - washout constant (e.g., 5
to 10 s); Tlead and Tlag - parameters for phase compensation;
n - number of lead-lag blocks (usually two blocks); φc - phase
required compensation; argRj - phase angle of residue Rj ; ωn
- dominant oscillation mode frequency; The design parameters
considered in the WADC are KWADC = 30, Tw = 10, Tlead
and Tlag = [63.244e−3 44.516e−3], output saturation limits
= [−0.15 0.15], and sensor time constant = 15e−3.
2) Time-domain Evaluation of WADC: It is essential to
evaluate the transient response and stability of the designed
controller for better performance on the nonlinear time-domain
simulation. The WADC processor is evaluated and tuned on
the HIL closed-loop the full-order model of the test system.
Fig. 7 shows the significant time delays involved from the
capture of measurements to the moment that actuator executes
the control signal to damp IAO modes. We configure the PMUs
to transmit the data at 60 fps. It is observed that the mean
processing time of each frame by the PMU is 2.865 ms and
the WADC processing time is 1.28 ms.
We have applied 5%-magnitude pulse for 12 cycles at the
voltage reference of the Generator 1. We have tuned the PSS
for different scenarios such as one-PSS in the system and two-
PSSs in the system using the same design approach used for
WA-PSS i.e., LMI method. Figs. 8a and 8b show the effect
of IAO damping by having a PSS at one location in the
system during the normal operation and voltage perturbation
accordingly. In this case, PSS at two locations shows relatively
more damping but insufficient to damp IAO. We have executed
the same exercise but modeled a WADC actuator, WA-PSS, at
Generator 3 in the system. Figs. 9a and 9b show the effect
of IAO damping by having a PSS at one location in the
system during the normal operation and voltage perturbation
accordingly along with the WADC at Generator 3. In this case,
both the scenarios provide sufficient damping to the IAO. It
draws the significant performance by WADC to damp IAO in
the system.
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The WADC performance during voltage perturbation when
PSS deployed at all the generator locations is shown in
Fig. 10. We observed that the oscillations settle down for the
small-signal disturbance. We conducted eigenvalue analysis
and obtained IAO mode parameters, namely, damping ratio –
0.0612 and oscillation frequency – 0.6436 Hz. We considered
this mode as a critical IAO mode. When we deploy either one
PSS or two PSSs in a system, we observed their contribution of
the damping ratio to the local modes is more compared to the
IAO mode. However, when we install PSS at four generators in
the two areas, the damping ratio increased to 0.313. When we
tested the system with one WADC and one PSS, the damping
ratio increased to 0.156, and in the case of one WADC and two
PSS, it increased to 0.243. When we deploy all the four PSS
and one WADCs in the system, the damping ratio increased
to 0.378. Finally, we tested the system with four PSS and two
WADCs, and the damping ratio increased to 0.396. Thus, we
evaluated significant damping by WADC to the IAO modes.
B. Preparation of Dataset for Machine Learning Models
In accordance with the Section III-A, we consider the αpsoc
and βcsae as follows. We consider αvp = 5 ∗ 4 = 20
scenarios, which includes five voltage perturbations (2− 10%
magnitude pulse at an interval of 2%), applied for 12 cycles
at the voltage reference of the four generators. We consider
αf = 10 scenarios, which includes three unsymmetrical
faults, namely, Single line-to-ground fault (LG), Line-to-line
fault (LL) and Double Line-to-ground fault (LLG), and two
symmetrical faults, namely, Three-phase short circuit fault
(LLL) and Three-phase-to-ground fault (LLLG). We have
applied these faults at two tie-line buses and fault cleared
in 8 cycles. We consider 20 generation-load (αld and αgd)
dispatched scenarios, which includes a load variation from
70% to 110% at an interval of 2%. We consider αlc = 2
scenarios, which includes line contingencies on the criti-
cal two tie-lines. Thus, we consider αpsoc = 20 + 10 +
20 + 2 = 52 scenarios. We consider βp = 6 ∗ 5 ∗ 5 =
150 scenarios, which includes six pulse magnitude variables
(0.0040, 0.0030, 0.0025, 0.0020, 0.0015, 0.0010), five pulse
period variables (1/0.5, 1/0.9, 1/1.2, 1/1.4, 1/1.8) and five
pulse width percentage ON variables (90, 60, 30, 20, 10).
These values are considered based on the empirical analysis
of the considered test system. We consider βr = 10 scenarios,
which includes ten different slope values of the ramp signal.
We also consider βfd = 10 false-data injection attack scenar-
ios. Thus, we consider βcsae = 150+10+10 = 170 scenarios.
As the WADC module uses six measurement signals and
two control signal, we consider applying these stealthy cyber-
attack vectors on the combination of the eight signals, i.e.,
28 = 256. We consider wa = 0.125 such that we dynamically
select only 12.5% of the combinations of the eight signals.
Therefore, the new combination set has 0.125∗256 = 32. The
complete set of attack scenarios are 170∗32 = 5440. Thus, we
consider a dataset of D = 5440 ∗ 52 + 52 = 282932 different
simulation scenarios. Each scenario includes 20 seconds of
data, which means 20 ∗ fps = 20 ∗ 60 = 1200 data points,
and is labeled with reference to one of the four activity
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Fig. 11. Performance of ADM for Pulse Attack during the Normal (a-c) and
Voltage Perturbation (d-f) Scenarios
scenarios. Labeled data is essential for training supervised ML
model. We have prepared a computational environment on the
PowerCyber testbed available at Iowa State University. The
computational set up for the experiment includes 100 cores
with 2.3 GHz and 128 GB RAM. We have used Windows
2016 server environment to setup Matlab R2019a. We use
the latest parallel computing toolbox that assigns a worker
to a core with an upper cap of 512 simultaneous workers
in a cluster. Each active worker executes simulation instance
and archives the data. Thus, we have prepared a dataset that
includes a combined power system operating conditions and
cyberattack events-based activities. The total execution time
of the data generation set is approximately 23 hrs under the
testbed environment.
C. Feature Extraction and Training ML Algorithms
We consider applying the process of extracting features as
defined in the Section III-B on the dataset, D. The dataset
is processed as a set of data points, which we refer as a
window of dataset. With the empirical evaluation of different
simulation test cases, we observe that 1/5∗fps=1/5∗60=12-
point window size provide better set of data patterns to
compute the features. We consider moving window with 1-
point step size so that the Feature Extraction module computes
the selected features at the signal data rate. We consider 60%
of the dataset for training the ML model and 40% of the dataset
for the process of testing.
As discussed in Section III-B, we consider the TKEO,
WASM, and primitive measures, as standalone features, and
compute PCA on a subset of primitive measures for dimen-
sionality reduction. We preserve linearly independent TKEO,
and WASM measure features to capture the physics-based grid
dynamics and characteristics. While in the implementation
of the algorithms, we have followed an iterative approach
to select the required subset of primitive measures to be
used for PCA for dimensionality reduction. Subsequently, the
window frames of the labeled-dataset are used as an input to
prepare a rich dataset of features to train ML algorithms. These
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Fig. 12. Performance of ADM for Ramp Attack during the Normal (a-c)
and Voltage Perturbation (d-f) Scenarios
window frames, for example, a length of 12 points (12/60
s window), feed to the proposed feature functions, namely,
TKEO, WASM, primitive measures and PCA (on a subset of
primitive features). The feature extraction algorithm computes
all of these feature functions to prepare a vector of feature
values. The feature values of the entire training dataset are
used for training ML algorithms, while the feature values of
the whole testing dataset used for testing the ML algorithms to
determine false positives and false negatives. It is an iterative
process, and consequently, we consider a trained ML model
that exhibited better detection accuracy.
We consider different Decision Tree (DT) and KNN ML
models for the training. We observe that the Fine KNN ML
model exhibits better accuracy with 96.5% compared to other
ML models as shown in Fig. 13. We use the Euclidean
distance metric with one neighbor in the KNN. The model
is trained to detect the designed significant activities such as
Normal, Perturbation, Attack and PerturbationAndAttack from
the measurement and control signal streaming data.
D. Integration of ADM and WADC
The KNN-based AD and the mitigation module are inte-
grated with the WADC as shown in Fig. 5 for the demonstra-
tion and evaluation in the closed-loop simulation. We use the
zero-order hold (ZOH) for preserving the input at the time-step
of signal data rate (60 fps) and transfer the values to buffer
to hold for a 12-point window. The trained ML model uses
the features as input and predicts the activity type. Mitigation
module uses the activity type and the WADC signal to generate
the attack-resilient WADC signal and status data, which fed
to the wide-area actuator deployed at Generator-3.
E. Results and Observation of ADM with WADC
Figs. 11-12 show the performance of the proposed ADM
with WADC for the Pulse and Ramp stealthy cyber-attack
vectors during the normal operation and voltage perturbation
scenario. We apply the Pulse attack vector (0.0036, 1/0.75
and 75%) and the Ramp attack vector for the duration of
Fig. 13. Detection Accuracy of Trained ML Model using KNN without &
with Proposed Domain-Specific Features
the 1 − 10 seconds. It is observed that impact on the tie-
line power flow persist even after the completion of attack
for around 1− 2 seconds. We observed that the Pulse attacks
introduce frequency components and impact the power flow to
a low steady-state value during the attack period. It also injects
overshoots at the start of attack. We observe that the Ramp
attacks impact the power flow to high steady-state value during
the attack period. It also injects high amplitude overshoots at
the start of attack.
In addition to the stability and system operation impact
on the power system, to evaluate the impact trajectory char-
acteristics on the tie-line power flows affected due to the
attack vectors, we have computed characteristic parameters
such as peak overshoot, settling time, rise time, and os-
cillation components. In the case of normal power system
operation, as shown in Fig. 11a, when pulse attacks launched
on either PMU-2 signal or WADC signal, the tie-line power
flow experienced an increased oscillation trajectory. However,
when the pulse attack launched on the PMU-5 signal, the
tie-line power flow experienced high overshoot and relatively
decreased oscillation trajectory. In the case of normal power
system operation, as shown in Fig. 12a, when ramp attacks
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launched on either WADC signal or PMU-2, the tie-line power
flow experienced positive peak overshoot. However, when the
ramp attack launched on the PMU-2 signal, the tie-line power
flow experienced negative peak overshoot with relatively less
amplitude. It is observed that the ADM sets the WADC status
to local-signal mode, as shown in Fig. 11, where the inter-tie
line power flow exhibits the same damping characteristics as
if the system works on local-signal based actuators.
F. Evaluation of Anomaly Detection
Figs. 13a and 13b show True Positive and False Negative
rates for the trained ML models without and with domain-
specific features accordingly. We observed that the trained
ML model with domain-specific features had exhibited an
enhanced detection accuracy at all the activities. The trained
KNN ML model (Fig. 13b) has shown better performance
with 96.5% accuracy. The model predicts less than 1% of
Attack activity as Normal and 3% of Attack activity as
PerturbationAndAttack activity. The model predicts the Per-
turbationAndAttack as Perturbation with 1%, as Attack with
5%, and as PerturbationAndAttack with 94% accuracy. The
characteristic patterns of Attack and PerturbationAndAttack
can be in proximity to Perturbation characteristics by stealthy
cyber-attack vectors. It results in a significant challenge to
ML for the activity detection with higher accuracy. The
inclusion of domain features such as TKEO and WASMs
provided better measures to train the ML model to detect the
PerturbationAndAttack activity with 94% accuracy. It can be
further improved by fine-tuned parameter settings of the ML
models and dynamic window length.
G. Evaluation of Mitigation Technique
In accordance with the model-based mitigation technique
defined in the Section III-D, the Figs. 11 and 12 show the
effective performance of the mitigation operation in response
to the Pulse and Ramp stealthy cyber-attack vectors dur-
ing Normal and Voltage Perturbation operating conditions.
Though it works in most of the scenarios, the rule three poses
a limitation to switch to local-signal based actuators during
the perturbation of the PerturbationAndAttack scenario. We
envision to address the limitation of the mitigation module by
devising a statistical or model-based technique to synthesize
an approximate WADC signal to use as a mitigation operation.
However, the approximated signal can only be sent in the case
of attacks on the compromised measurement signals. If there is
an attack on the control signal, then it must switch to the local
mode for seamless operation of centralized ADM located at
the control center. This limitation can further be addressed
by deploying an ADM at each actuator with the trade-off
to the increased complexity in the management, security and
computational processing of the decentralized ADM operation.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed anomaly detection using Machine
Learning and model-based mitigation for ensuring secure and
attack-resilient WADC system operation. We have proposed
physics-based and signal-entropy based feature extraction to
increase the accuracy and robustness of the trained ML model.
These domain-specific features have increased the efficacy of
the ADM module in detecting anomalies that are in proximity
to the characteristics of natural power system events. We have
demonstrated the proposed ADM integrated with WADC on
the HIL synchrophasor CPS security testbed for the two-area
four-machine power system. The test results witnessed ADM
module with 96.5% accuracy including low false positive and
negative rates for the data-integrity attacks. As the proposed
ADM module executes at the control center and eliminates the
need for ADMs at sensors, it can be adopted seamlessly by
the utilities for the resilient operation of WACS application.
Our future work includes devising deep learning-based attack
resilient control algorithms for WAMPAC applications.
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